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Abstract: This paper studies the effects of household income on labor participation and school 
enrollment of children aged 10 to 14 in Brazil using a social security reform as a source of 
exogenous variation in household income. We find that increased benefits are associated with 
increases in school enrollment for girls, as well as a smaller reduction in their labor participation, 
but find no effects for boys. We also uncover evidence that the gender of the benefit receiver 
matters for girls’ labor variables: only benefits received by females reduce girls’ work.  
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How do income increases affect school enrollment and child labor participation in developing 
countries? That is an important question for the design of policies to enhance the human capital 
of poor children and reduce inequality in developing countries. If school enrollment increases 
and entry to the labor market is delayed as incomes rise, targeted transfers to the poor may have 
long-lasting benefits besides the direct improvement in their consumption levels.2 That is more 
likely to occur if the “luxury axiom”, which posits that children only work when their family is 
unable to meet its basic needs, is valid (Basu and Van 1999). On the other hand, if children 
outcomes are insensitive to rising incomes (for instance, if child labor is related to factors other 
than low income levels), then policies such as enrollment subsidies, improvements in school 
quality and teacher pay, construction of new schools or conditional cash transfers might be more 
adequate at reducing child labor and increasing school enrollment than interventions that directly 
aiming to increase household income (without changing relative prices), such as pure cash 
transfers. 
There is a large (and still expanding) literature on the determinants of child labor and school 
enrollment decisions in developing countries.3 Much of this literature has inquired about the 
effects of increased incomes on child labor, typically finding that poverty or negative economic 
shocks are important factors driving children to work. Among other empirical works, Edmonds 
(2005) finds that seemingly permanent increases in income in Vietnam explain most of the 
observed decline in child labor; Yang (2007) finds that increased receipt of overseas remittances 
due to favorable exchange rate movements leads to enhanced human capital investment in the 
Philippines; Duryea, Lam and Levison (2007) find that child labor helps urban Brazilian families 
smoothing income during temporary unemployment spells of their adult male household head; 
and the literature has found positive effects on school enrollment of conditional cash transfer 
programs such as Bolsa Escola in Brazil (Bourguignon, Ferreira and Leite 2003) and Progresa in 
Mexico (Schultz 2004), while the latter is also related to a significant reduction in market work.4  
This paper belongs to the same strand as the papers by Duflo (1999), Bertrand, Miller and 
Mullainathan (2003) and Ardington, Case and Hosegood (2009) which explored the effects of 
social pensions in South Africa on respectively children health outcomes and labor force 
participation of prime-aged males coresiding with pensioners. It is also directly related to the 
study by Edmonds (2006) on the effects of anticipated pension income in South Africa. That 
paper documents large changes in children outcomes when black South African families become 
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eligible for pension benefits. Since receipt of those pensions is fully anticipatable, Edmonds 
argues that changes in school enrollment upon eligibility to those benefits are suggestive of the 
importance of credit constraints for the education decisions of those households.  
This paper explores exogenous variation in social security income for rural workers in Brazil 
to estimate the impact of an exogenous increase in income on children's labor participation and 
school enrollment. The source of the exogenous increase was a reform to social security for rural 
workers which brought about a reduction in the minimum eligibility age for old-age benefits for 
rural workers from 65 to 60 for males and 55 for females; the end of a rule that determined that 
no more than one person per household would be eligible to receive old-age benefits for rural 
workers; and an increase in the size of benefits from half a minimum wage to one minimum 
wage.5  
The paper identifies the effect of benefits on the schooling and labor outcomes of children of 
ages 10 to 14 by comparing the changes in the outcomes for children in households that 
benefited from the reform (broadly speaking, those with elderly rural workers older than the 
minimum age eligibility) with those who did not. Because the eligibility to the old-age program 
for rural workers is based on observable characteristics such as age, gender, and past or present 
occupation in rural activities, the reform lends itself well for a triple differences design. For the 
sake of explanation, consider now only the reduction in eligibility age for male rural workers 
from 65 to 60. A feasible difference-in-differences estimate would compare the time trends of 
benefits for those households whose oldest male is 60-64 years old (just became eligible) with 
those with a slightly younger oldest male (say, 55-59 years old). Since the reform affected only 
benefits for rural workers, one might isolate age-specific trends not related to the reform by 
comparing the difference-in-differences of rural and urban households, hence the triple 
differences design (also known as difference-in-differences-in-differences).6  
This design can be then extended to accommodate the changes in old-age benefits for rural 
female workers and other changes in benefit receipts, such as the increase in benefits for the 
already eligible rural workers from ½ to 1 minimum wages in a regression framework. Our 
empirical model is thus an extension of the triple differences design. It  includes dummies for 
after the reform, rural location (our proxy for rural occupation, past and present) and the age of 
the oldest male and female in the household; the interactions between after the reform and rural 
location, after the reform and the age of the oldest male and female, and rural location and the 
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age of the oldest male and female (i.e. all first-level effects and their second-level interactions), 
while excluding all third-level interactions except the after X rural X age combinations that pin 
down a group gaining from the reform. 
Since we identify exogenous variation in potential benefits for each household due to the 
reform, our estimates of the impact of the reform on children’s outcomes have a causal 
interpretation in the sense of Angrist, Imbens and Rubin (1996). We interpret our estimates as 
reflecting the effect of benefits on the subset of households that stood to gain and actually gained 
from the reform (compliers in the jargon of the LATE theorem, Imbens and Angrist 1994). That 
is a relevant group for the question at hand because low school enrollment and high incidence of 
child labor are prevalent among children in rural areas.  
This empirical strategy also overcomes some pervasive problems in the literature. Since the 
estimates are based on comparing changes over time between groups affected or not by the 
reform, they are not tainted by unobserved factors such as tastes for human capital investments 
that might be correlated with occupational choice, but stable over time. Cross-sectional studies 
relating child labor and household income are not able to identify the pure effect of income from 
the effects of unobserved characteristics that may be correlated with income. For instance, child 
labor and school enrollment may be correlated with household income because dynasties with 
more patience, greater ability, or a stronger taste for education will have adults with higher 
education levels and also higher income—an instance of omitted variable bias. Hence the cross-
sectional relationship between household income and child labor is not informative of the likely 
effect of policies that transfer income to families with children, because it overestimates the 
effects of income transfers to poor families on children' labor participation and school enrollment 
decisions. On the other hand, measurement error in the benefits variable generates attenuation 
(downward) bias in the estimated effect of income on children outcomes. This problem may be 
particularly relevant in the early nineties Brazilian setting when inflation was high and variable; 
and also when variables correlated with income, such as family background and community 
characteristics, are included in the regression.  
Finally, this paper explores the possibility that income received by females generates different 
outcomes as income received by males. In agreement with the previous results by Thomas, 
Schoeni and Strauss (1996), Duflo (1999) and Ponczek (2007), we find that some of girls’ 
outcomes are sensitive to the gender of the benefit receiver. Point estimates suggest that boys’ 
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outcomes also differ depending on gender of the receiver, but the differences are statistically 
insignificant.  
Section I presents background information about child labor in Brazil. Section II presents the 
empirical strategy. Section III describes the data used in the empirical sections. Section IV 
presents the regression results. Section V examines the possibility that selection biases are 
driving the results instead of causal effects, finding reassuring evidence in favor of a causal 
interpretation. Section VI concludes. 
 
I. Background information about child labor in Brazil 
 
Brazil has one of Latin America’s highest rates of child labor force participation. In 1995, 
when participation rates for children aged 10-14 in Latin America and Caribbean (LAC) were 
9.8 percent, the figures for Brazil were as high as 16 percent.7 Brazil’s high rate of child labor 
relative to LAC averages has persisted over decades: in 1950, when child labor participation rate 
was 19.4 percent for the LAC average, Brazil lagged behind with a 23.5 percent child labor 
participation rate. However, since the early nineties, the labor force participation for boys and 
girls aged 12 to 14 has trended downward, while the profile for children aged 10 and 11 has 
remained flat (Figure 1). 
The majority of Brazilian child laborers work in agriculture activities. While only 24 percent 
of youths 10-24 are employed in agriculture, 69 percent of the work force aged 10-11 and 55 
percent of the work force aged 12-14 are in that sector (IBGE, 1997). Therefore, effective 
policies to reduce child labor ought to change the incentives and constraints faced by rural 
families.  
The mirror image of Brazil’s high child labor rates of children is a dismal educational record 
(for a collection of papers on education and income inequality in Brazil, see Birdsall and Sabot 
1996). Behrman and Schneider (1996) find that secondary school enrollment rates in Brazil are 
respectively 7.7 percent and 16.4 percent below their “expected values” for females and males 
after conditioning on income levels and measures of schooling cost. Figure 2 shows the time 
series of school enrollment rates for children 10 to 14. Enrollment rates for girls are in general 
higher than for boys; enrollment rates increased for all ages during the nineties, but more sharply 
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for the older children (12 to 14 year olds); the opposing trends in child work and school 
enrollment for those age groups hint that those two activities compete for children’s time.  
Table 1 shows an increase of 7.8 percentage points in the proportion of children 10-14 going 
to school and not working for pay between 1989 and 1995 (these figures exclude the Northern 
region because its rural areas were then out of the PNAD reach). The proportion of children 
going to school and also working for pay declines slightly, adding up to a total increase of 6.9 
percentage points in the proportion of children going to school. During that period, the 
proportion of children working for pay declined by about 4 percentage points, and the increase in 
the enrollment rates of children working for pay from 51 percent in 1989 to 69 percent in 1995.  
But the institutional environment is somewhat at odds with the observed outcomes. Schooling 
is compulsory in Brazil up to age 14 or completion of the eighth grade.8 Public schools are free. 
Moreover, they provide free meals. Work is only allowed for children 14 and older, with 
apprenticeship available at age 12. Hazardous activities are only available for youths older than 
18, and for some activities, older than 21. Starting in 1996, the federal government instituted the 
Child Labor Eradication Program (Programa de Erradicação do Trabalho Infantil, or PETI) 
with a pilot program in the charcoal producing region of the state of Mato Grosso do Sul. By 
1999, this program was expanded to eight other states.9   
 
II. Description of the Social Security reform 
 
The Brazilian social security reform of 1991 provides a unique opportunity to study the effect 
of exogenous changes in income on household economic choices, such as elderly labor 
participation, human capital investments on children or marriage and living arrangements of the 
elderly. Because this reform provides a source of exogenous variation in benefits that is not 
correlated with a family’s demand for investment in human capital or disutility from child work, 
it can be used to identify the effect of exogenous income transfers on children outcomes, such as 
school enrollment and labor participation measures. 
This reform reduced the minimum eligibility age for rural old-age benefits for men from 65 to 
60, increased the minimum benefit paid to rural old-age beneficiaries from 50 percent to 100 
percent of the minimum wage, extended old-age benefits to female rural workers who were not 
heads of households (thereby extending the benefits to the previously uncovered elderly wives of 
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rural workers), and reduced the age at which women qualified for benefits from 60 to 55. 
Because old-age benefits for rural workers are not subject to either an earnings test or retirement 
requirement, once a rural worker reaches the minimum eligibility age, there is no gain in 
delaying filing the application for old-age benefits. The only requirement is to provide the proofs 
of age and past rural activity that validate his or her claim to eligibility (for a list of the valid 
sufficient proofs of past rural activity, see de Carvalho Filho, 2000a or 2008). 
The effect of the reform on benefit income for each household thus depends on the age, 
gender, occupation, and marriage status of each household member. More specifically, based on 
those characteristics, we can identify the households which potentially benefited from the 
reform. Those are the ones with rural workers who became eligible due to reduction in the 
minimum eligibility age (males age 60-64, females age 55-59); with rural workers who benefited 
from the increase in benefits from ½ to 1 minimum wage (males older than 65, and females older 
than 60); and households with more than one rural worker of eligibility age.  
For example, a household with a 66 year old male rural worker married to a 57 year old 
female rural worker was eligible to receive total benefits in the value of ½ of the minimum wage 
before the reform. After the reform, the husband would receive 1 minimum wage (because of the 
increase in the floor benefit) and so would the wife (because of the end of the one-person per 
household rule and the reduction in the minimum eligibility age). 
The timing of the reform can be summarized as follows: In 1988, a new Constitution 
mandating that reforms be done on rural social security was promulgated, and it is plausible that 
more informed workers became aware of the future changes yet to be implemented. Immediately 
after July 1991, when the ordinary law making the constitutionally mandated reform operational 
was passed (Law #8212/8213), benefit payments to rural beneficiaries of old-age pensions 
increased automatically in general from 50 to 100 percent of the minimum wage, and newly 
eligible rural workers (e.g. 60 to 64 year old males) began to apply for benefits. By September 
1992, the month of reference of the 1992 household survey used in this paper, take-up of new 
benefits was still incomplete, either for bureaucratic reasons or because of delays in the spread of 
information. Finally, by September 1993, the month of reference of the 1993 survey, almost all 
of the take-up process had been completed and newly eligible workers were already receiving 
their benefits. In order to have a sharp comparison between pre- and post-reform, we therefore 
exclude the data for the 1992 survey because that is a transition year. Figure 3 shows the flow of 
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newly granted old-age benefits over time. Although the change in the law happened in July 1991, 
there is no apparent increase in the yearly flow of new granted benefits before 1992, until a spike 
is apparent in 1993 and 1994 (Anuário Estatístico da Previdência 1998). The figure also shows 
that the yearly flow of new disability benefits shrinks with the extension of old-age benefits, 
suggesting that disability and old-age benefits are substitutes for the age group affected by the 
reform. Workers in Brazil may also receive benefits based on length of service, but the tests 
required for this kind of benefit are in practice prohibitive for rural workers, as shown by the 
small or negligible flow of length-of-service benefits in Figure 3 (only about ½ percent of all 
rural benefits are of the length-of-service type). 
 
III. Data  
 
We use the Pesquisa Nacional por Amostra de Domicílios, or PNAD, to make inferences 
about the labor participation and school enrollment outcomes of 10 to 14 year old children. The 
PNAD is an annual household survey with sample size of about 1/500 of the Brazilian 
population (about 100,000 households), designed to produce a picture of the living conditions 
and economic life of the Brazilian population, rural and urban. For every individual, we observe 
characteristics such as age, race, education, school enrollment, income from different sources, 
housing and living arrangements, family structure, work, fertility, migration and other topics. We 
observe various measures of labor supply, including hours of work, labor force non-participation 
and earnings. 
Work related questions are asked about all individuals over 10 years old. To identify rural 
workers, the survey allows one to observe every worker’s current occupation if any, or past 
occupation up to a four years recall, but because the empirical strategy in this paper does not 
depend on the exact assignment of occupation to each observation, we use rural location as a 
proxy for rural occupation. 
The empirical exercise will use data for the years 1989, 1990, 1993 and 1995. The PNAD 
survey was not carried out in 1991. The reform was in effect after that. Data for years previous to 
1989 may bring confounding factors because 1988 was a year of major changes in labor 
regulations due to the promulgation of the Constitution of 1988. The PNAD survey was not 
carried out in 1994. There are 134,350 observations for children 10 to 14 years old for the survey 
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years 1989, 1990, 1993 and 1995. The lower limit of the age range is given by the survey design 
(the survey does not ask work related questions to younger children), while the upper limit 
represents the minimum age for legal work in Brazil (and is also in concordance with the ILO 
definition of child labor). Of those, we exclude the children who are heads of households or their 
spouses, boarders, live-in domestic employees or the live-in children of domestic employees, 
which amount to 776 children or 0.6 percent of all observations. The remaining 133,574 
observations are the children who are related to the head of the household or are “aggregated” to 
the head’s family. Then, we exclude 2,168 observations from household with at least one person 
with 12 years of schooling because those more educated households may be very different from 
the households affected by the reform. After those exclusions, our sample size is 131,406 (2.2% 
less than our initial sample). 
The PNAD classifies social security benefits into two broad categories: aposentadorias, 
which comprise disability, old age and length of service benefits, and pensões, which comprise 
military and survivors' income maintenance benefits. Throughout this paper we use the word 
‘benefits’ to denote the aposentadoria receipts in the PNAD survey.10 There are many large 
outliers for benefits, and to avoid undue influence of a few influential extreme observations on 
our results, we topcode household benefits at the 99 percentile of the household distribution (i.e. 
R$1130 per month). 
The outcomes analyzed in this paper were chosen in order to capture different dimensions of 
children’s work and schooling choices (detailed descriptions of these variables can be found in 
the Appendix). “Enrolled in school” measures school enrollment/attendance (see discussion in 
Appendix). The variable “Worked for pay in reference week” (in short, “worked for pay”) 
intends to capture children’s involvement in the wage economy.11 “Total hours per week, all 
jobs” measures the time intensity of children’s labor. In the 1989 and 1990 surveys, hours 
worked by unpaid workers less than 15 per week were coded as zero. To ensure consistency, 
hours of unpaid workers below 15 per week are recoded to zero in the 1993 and 1995 surveys.12 
All the benefits values are measured in Reais of January 2002 (when R$2.38=US$1.00), using 
the deflator for the PNAD derived by Courseil and Foguel (2002), and correcting for 
geographical differences in price levels as in Ferreira and Paes de Barros (1999). Table 2 
presents the means and standard deviations of some of the variables used in this paper, by gender 
of the child and for five different subsamples: all, mature (households with at least one person 
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older than 50), rural location, before the reform (1989 and 1990) and after the reform (1993 and 
1995). It shows how the standard deviation of the benefit variable is reduced by one third when 
we cap it at the 99 percentile thereby reducing the influence of observations with extremely high 
benefits; how the average of benefits as a ratio to total income increased from 5.2 percent to 6.5 
percent after the reform for the sample of households with a boy 10-14 year old; and how mature 
households differ from the general population (they receive more benefits, depend more on 
benefits as proportion of total income, have lower total income, lower school enrollment, higher 
child work, are more likely to be white, and headed by a woman). 
The direct effects of the reform on household benefit income and take-up rates can be gauged 
in a triple differences framework—i.e. comparing the changes in the differences between eligible 
and near eligible households in rural and urban areas (de Carvalho Filho 2008). To define 
eligibility, we use the age of the oldest male and female on each household (as in Edmonds 
2006). Table 3 presents estimates of the triple differences for total benefits and number of benefit 
receivers by gender, using the age of the oldest male and female in the household, illustrating 
how the implementation of the reform increased the benefit income for some specific groups of 
households relative to similar others. Focusing on male benefits (Table 3, left side of the top 
panel), we find that while male benefits for rural households whose oldest male is 60-64 (made 
eligible by the reform) increased by R$74.5 (in Reais of Jan. 2002) between 1989-90 (before) 
and 1993-95 (after), for rural households whose oldest male is 55-59 (those just younger than the 
newly eligible), male benefits increase by R$7.3—a difference in difference of R$67.2. For 
urban households, we find that there was a relative increase in average benefits for the 60-64 
relative to the 55-59 households of R$29.2, partly because location of residence is an imperfect 
proxy for rural occupation (some rural workers live in areas classified as urban), but also because 
other modifications may have taken place in aposentadoria benefits for urban workers. The 
difference between the difference-in-differences for rural and urban households is the triple 
difference estimate of R$38.1 (statistically significant at the 1 percent level). The triple 
differences for number of males receiving benefits (Table 3, right side of the top panel) shows 
also a significant impact of the reform (an increase of 0.20 in the number of male benefit 
receivers per household).13  
The bottom panel of Table 3 then presents the triple difference estimates based on the age of 
the oldest female, comparing the changes for the households whose oldest female is 55-59 (made 
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eligible by the reform) and 50-54 year old (those just younger than the newly eligible). The 
patterns are similar—there is a increase in female benefits for the rural households whose oldest 
female is 55-59 relative to the 50-54 ones (by R$38.6), whereas the analogous figure for urban 
areas was R$12.6. The difference in the relative increase in benefits between rural and urban 
households is the triple difference estimate of R$26.0 (statistically significant at the 1 percent 
level). In line with what we found for male benefits, we find significant triple differences 
estimates for the number of female benefit receivers in the rural households whose oldest female 
is in the 55-59 year old bracket. 
The same triple differences framework can be applied to children’s outcomes. In Table 4 we 
pool together boys and girls age 10-14 and present triple differences estimates of the effect of the 
reform on school enrollment and work for pay. We find no evidence supporting the hypothesis 
that children outcomes improved for families with an elderly male gaining from the reform 
(Table 4, top panel). We also find larger point estimates of school enrollment increases and work 
for pay decreases for children coresiding with an elderly female benefiting from the reform, but 
standard errors are wide and we cannot reject the hypothesis of no effect in this very simple 
framework. In the remainder of the paper, we will extend this framework to account for other 
changes in rural old-age benefits (e.g. the increase in benefits for the already eligible). In 
summary, the evidence from triple differences estimates indicates a very strong first-stage 
relationship between the reform and benefits (the reform indeed happened!) but only some 
indication that the increase in benefits related to the reform caused improvements in school 
enrollment and work for pay for the households with an elderly female stood to gain from the 
reform. 
 
IV. Empirical strategy and results 
 
The use of variation in household social security income to identify the effect of exogenous 
income on child work and school enrollment requires adequate control for the effects of living 
with an elderly person unrelated to old-age benefits. From one single cross-section, one cannot 
identify the effects of non-labor income coming from old-age benefits from the very effect of the 
presence of an elderly person (e.g. elderly people testify for the importance of patience and 
investment in human capital, children from older parents are raised in a different manner than 
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other children), or elderly presence changes the demand for children input to household 
production.  
In this paper, we use a triple difference strategy exploring an exogenous reform in social 
security to separate the effects of benefits from the effects related to the presence of an elderly 
person.14 Because the reform affects some children but not others, the effects of the reform can 
be identified by comparing the changes in average outcomes for children affected by the reform 
(i.e. living with elderly who became eligible or whose benefits increased) with those for other 
similar children in rural areas, and then subtracting from this difference-in-differences the similar 
statistic for urban area children (who are less likely to coreside with a rural elderly), thus 
obtaining a triple difference estimate. Below we formalize this strategy in a regression 
framework. 
 
A. First-Stage: From the social security reform to actual benefits received 
 
The triple differences strategy readily translates to a regression framework. The reduced form 
first-stage equation shows how the social security reform changed actual benefits received by the 
households in our sample. The first stage equation that we estimate is: 
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In the equation above, Y is the outcome of interest (e.g. household benefit receipts; or number 
of benefit receivers in the household); mnew  captures the interaction between oldest male in age 
group 60-64 in a rural location and after the reform—those are the observable characteristics of 
newly eligible males that were younger than the pre-reform eligibility age, but older than the 
post-reform one; fnew  captures the similar effect for females; mraise and fraise capture the effect of 
the increase in the minimum benefit from ½ minimum wage to one minimum wage for those 
who were already eligible pre-reform (i.e. male rural workers older than 65; female rural workers 
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older than 60); ,f mfake fake   are dummies for the triple interaction between after, rural location and 
the age range immediately younger than the minimum age to benefit from the reform, and are 
expected to be jointly insignificant if our identification assumption is valid; rural and after  are 
dummies for rural location and after the reform; r a   stands for the interaction between rural and 
after; the sequences { m } and  { f } account for the age of the oldest male and female in the 
household; and { r m  }, { r f  }, { a m  }, { a f  } stand for collection of dummies for interactions 
between age of oldest male (female) and rural location, and oldest male (female) and after the 
reform. 
The estimates for the first stage regressions are presented in Table FS. Because we have 
categorical variables in our right-hand side, we group the observations in groups defined by rural 
location, time, age of the oldest male and age of the oldest female in order to get the right 
standard errors for this regression and the IV estimates (as suggested in Angrist and Pischke 
2009, pp. 313-314). The triple interactions indicating the households potentially benefiting from 
the reform are of the expected sign and in general significant at the 1% level. The F-statistics for 
the joint significance of the instruments attest for their strength. Comparing before and after the 
reform, rural households whose oldest male member was aged 60-64 (newly eligible male rural 
workers) have 0.30 more benefit receivers, of which 0.23 are males, and their total monthly 
benefits are higher by R$55.70 (which implies an average increase in benefits conditional on one 
additional benefit receiver of R$188.18, very close to the average minimum wage at constant 
prices in the after period, R$164.87). For rural households whose oldest female is in the age 
range potentially benefiting from the lower retirement age, we also find a highly significant and 
sizeable increase in the number of pension (ages 55-59) and in benefit receipts. The presence of 
an elderly male already older than the minimum retirement age before the reform is associated in 
general with no effect on the number of benefit receivers, but significant effects on benefit levels 
(see raisem  in columns 1-3 and 5-8). We also present the results of the regression without the 
winsorizaton (topcoding) of the benefits variable in column (6) – as expected, the presence of 
extremely high observations for benefits reduces the F-stat for the joint significance of 
instruments, but they are still significant at any level. Lastly, we test the validity of our 
instruments by adding to the regression the interaction terms indicating those almost of age to 
gain from the reform (male_age5559*after*rural and female_age5054*after*rural) and their 
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coefficient is both jointly and individually insignificant (columns 2,7), which lends credibility to 
our identification strategy. 
 
B. Reduced form effect of reform on children outcomes 
 
We can estimate reduced form effects of the reform on children outcomes by substituting 
children outcomes for the left-hand side variable in equation (1) and then test for the joint 
significance of the excluded instruments male_age6064*after*rural, male_age65up*after*rural, 
female_age5559*after*rural and female_age60up*after*rural. We find significant effects from 
potentially gaining from the reform on girls’ enrollment (increase; based on F-test for joint 
significance of the excluded instruments) and work for pay (decrease; based on coefficients for 
excluded instruments tagging to increased female benefits) and no effect for boys’ outcome 
(Table 6). We also find that the dummies for male_age5559*after*rural and famele5054*after*rural 
that indicate the presence of those elderly just younger than the minimum age to gain from the 
reform are jointly insignificant as one would expect if families faced credit constraints such that 
the timing of income affect children activities (Edmonds  2006).  
Next we test the validity of our empirical strategy by applying it to variables that are not a 
priori supposed to be affected by the reform (e.g. dummy for black skin color); and to variables 
related to the household composition (whether the child in our data is the youngest one in the 
household and the number of children and adults in the household), and we find that our 
excluded instruments are jointly and individually insignificant for each one of those variables 
(Table 6, columns 7-10). 
 
C. Second-stage: From benefits to children outcomes 
 
In the second-stage regression, where we estimate the impact of the reform on school 
enrollment and child labor variables, we use the triple interactions between rural, after the reform 
and age of oldest male and female indicating the groups gaining from the reform 
(age6064*after*rural, male_age65up*after*rural, female_age5559*after*rural and 
female_age60up*after*rural ) as the excluded variables that will instrument for the level or 
presence of benefits in the household. The equation we estimate is: 
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In the equation above, y is the dependent variable (school enrollment or child labor variables), 
Y is either benefit receipts or number of benefit receivers in the household; rural and after  are 
dummies for rural location and after the reform; r a  stands for the interaction between rural and 
after; and { r m  }, { r f  }, { a m  } and { a f  } are interactions between age of oldest male 
(female) and rural location and after the reform. 
Table 7 presents the ordinary least-square estimates for the parameter  of equation (2). We 
estimate a positive coefficient on benefit levels for the school enrollment equation which implies 
a 2-2.5% increase in enrollment for R$100 in benefits and find no impact of benefits on the labor 
variables. We cannot claim causality for those results because we cannot preclude that there be 
an omitted variable correlated to both school enrollment and benefit levels, and we worry about 
attenuation bias, so we move next to IV estimates.  
Equation (2) above was estimated for 3 different outcomes by instrumental variables, using 
benefit levels and number of benefit receivers as the endogenous variable, for boys and girls 
samples; lumping male and female benefits together or not. The over-identification tests for the 
validity of instruments lend credibility to our IV strategy. The null hypothesis of valid instrument 
could not be rejected at the 5 percent level in any specification, but it was rejected at the 10 
percent level in one out of 24 specifications, which augurs well for the validity of our 
instruments. As in Angrist and Imbens (1995) and Kling (2000), we interpret the IV estimates 
based on the reform rules as the weighted average of causal effects for the subgroup affected by 
the reform – children living in households with a rural elderly, which we deem particularly 
interesting due to the high coincidence of rural activities,poverty and child vulnerability to child 
labor and dropping out of school.  
Tables 8 presents the instrumental variable estimates for the parameter  in a sample of 
children 10 to 14 year old. In the first four columns, there are estimates for the effect of 100 
Reais in benefits (in Reais of January 2002). We find different results for the effect of benefit 
levels for boys and girls enrollment—while a benefit increase of R$100 boosts girls’ school 
enrollment by 9.7 percentage points (significant at the 1 percent level), it has no effect for boys. 
This pattern is confirmed by the estimates of the effect of the number of benefit receivers—one 
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additional benefit receiver (for the subgroup affected by the reform) increases girls’ enrollment 
probability by over 23 percentage points (53 percentage points when the benefit receiver is a 
female). When we inquire whether the identity of the benefit receiver matters, as in previous 
literature on violations of the unitary model of the household in Brazilian data (Thomas 1990; 
Thomas, Schoeni and Strauss 1996), we cannot reject the null that the gender of the benefit 
receiver does not matter for children school enrollment. 
For the labor participation variables, the estimates imply that an increase of R$100 in total 
benefits in the household has no effect on the probability of having “worked in the reference 
week for pay” for boys, but it reduces work for pay by 3.6 percentage points for girls (but not 
statistically significant). For girls, we also found gender differences on the effect of benefits: 
girls’ work for pay is reduced when there are female benefit receivers or female benefits are 
higher, but no statistical significant effect can be found for male benefits (moreover, the effect of 
male benefits has the opposite signs). 
The estimates for hours of work in general show no reduction in hours by boys or girls when 
aggregating male and female benefits, but a reduction in girls’ hours in response to an increase in 
female benefits (-5.6 hours for each additional R$100s). We also find that marginally significant 
differences in the effect of male and female benefits on girls’ hours of work—as in the work for 
pay estimates, female benefits seem to be associated with reductions in hours, but not so male 
benefits. 
 
D. Assessing the robustness of the estimates 
 
Table 9 reports IV estimates of the effect of benefit levels on the outcomes of interest for 
different subsamples. In this table, columns (1)-(6) report the coefficient on total benefits for 
boys; columns (7)-(12) for girls. Each column represents a different subsample. Columns (1) and 
(7) reproduce the baseline result using the full sample as in Table IV, the other columns focus on 
the 5 different subsamples. The “mature” subsample attempts to restrict the sample to children in 
households similar to the ones benefitting from the reform by dropping all households without a 
resident older than 50 and whose residents have 12 years of schooling or more. The Northeastern 
subsample focuses interest in the region that is disproportionately represented in Brazil’s poverty 
statistics. The rural sample keeps only households located in rural areas, hence the identification 
is centered on the differences across the age profile, and not also between rural and urban 
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households. The 13-14 subsample focuses on the children at greater risk of working or dropping 
out of school. Finally, the head less than 4 subsample includes only the households whose head 
spent less than 4 years in school – which allows us to examine the claim that income transfers to 
the poor might not increase school enrollment by itself because the demand for education of the 
least educated poor is income inelastic. 
The different subsamples in general carry through the result that the level of old-age benefits 
have no effect on boys’ enrollment and work variables, in line with the results in Table 8. For 
girls, we find that the effect of benefit levels on enrollment rates appears robust and, 
interestingly, its magnitude increases in the subsamples of children from the Northeastern region 
and whose head of household is less educated. However, we find that the positive relationship 
disappears when the sample is restricted to rural households – i.e. the finding on girls’ 
enrollment relies on a comparison between differences-in-differences in rural and urban areas.  
Finally, the sign and magnitude of the effect of benefit levels on girls’ work variables appears 
reasonably robust (again, with the exception of the rural sample), yet not statistically significant. 
 
VI. Causal Effects or Selection Bias? 
 
The identification strategy of this paper depends on children not moving into (or away from) 
households receiving the new social security benefits, because children moving due to the reform 
may be systematically different from other children - therefore causing the estimates to be biased 
due to selection problems. For example, it is plausible that the decision to send a child to live 
with a grandparent after the increase in benefits might be correlated with unobserved 
characteristics such as preference for schooling.15  
Unfortunately in the absence of panel data, it is hard to gauge the empirical relevance of the 
selection of children into and out of households. The data permits us to test the null hypothesis 
that there were no changes in the number of children living with elderly who benefitted from the 
reform. This can be done in a triple differences setup similar to the one we used to identify the 
effect of the reform on children outcomes and old-age benefits.  
We estimate the equation: 
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where ne( a,b )  is the number of children of ages a through b living with elderly e; the  
coefficients capture the first and second level interactions between age, rural location and after 
the reform; and, finally, the  coefficients are the reduced-form effect of the reform, as in 
equation (1), and are the coefficients of interest. The null hypothesis that the reform did not 
cause changes in the composition of the elderly households benefitting from the reform can be 
tested by testing the null that the  coefficients are jointly equal to zero. 
We present the results in Table 10. We  fail to reject the null hypothesis that the reduced-form 
impact of the reform on the number of boys or girls coresiding with the elderly is nil. It is also 
reassuring that we were able to reject this null hypothesis when we substitute children of age 15-
19 for the 10-14 bracket – this indicates that our failure to reject the null hypothesis for the 10-14 
year olds may have to do with their actual behavior, not the test lacking statistical power.  
Another source of comfort that selection problems might not be empirically relevant is the 
narrow time span covered by the data used in this paper. To the extent that changes in the age 
distribution of income affects residential choices within the extended family, this effect is likely 
stronger in the long run after social norms have adapted to the new circumstances. It is 
reasonable that the impact on residential decisions may be muted in the short-term, only a few 
years after the reform came into effect.  
 
VI. Conclusions 
 
This paper used variation in old-age benefits received by rural workers due to a 
constitutionally mandated reform in social security system to identify the effect of income on 
labor outcomes and school enrollment of children of ages 10-14 in Brazil. The adoption of this 
empirical strategy based on exogenous variation in old-age benefits is justified for several 
reasons. First, one cannot identify the effect of non-labor income in cross-sectional comparisons 
between income levels and children’s outcomes owing to the confounding effects of other 
characteristics that are correlated with income. Second, because OLS estimates of the effect of 
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benefits might suffer from attenuation bias because of classical measurement error in the income 
measures (so any finding of no effect could be dismissed on those grounds). Finally and more 
importantly, an IV strategy allows one to identify a causal parameter of interest for policy 
makers and researchers – in this case, the effect of the reform on the families with an elderly in 
the rural areas that could potentially gain and indeed gained from the reform (the compliers). 
That is arguably a relevant parameter because both child labor and shortfalls in school 
enrollment in developing countries are more prevalent in rural areas (Edmonds 2007). 
We find that old-age benefits have the effect of increasing school enrollment of girls 
coresiding with old-age beneficiaries, particularly girls ages 13-14. Instrumental variables 
estimates imply that R$100 (In Reais of January 2002) of old-age benefits received by household 
members increases school enrollment rates of girls by 9.7 percent, with little or no effect for 
boys. There is also some evidence that increases in benefits have caused reductions in work for 
pay and work intensity for girls, but only for female benefits. Since male benefits appear to be 
irrelevant for girls’ schooling and labor decisions, the results indicate the existence of differences 
by gender of receiver and perhaps tensions between male and female adults over girls' use of 
time, with consequences for the design of transfer policies. If one considers school enrollment a 
"good" and labor participation a "bad", then male benefits are "less of a good" for girls. These 
results are similar to the findings by Duflo (1999) that in South Africa social pensions received 
by grandmothers benefits granddaughters relatively more than if received by grandfathers, and 
also highlight the importance of developing a collective view of the household (Thomas, Shoeni 
and Strauss 1996; Browning and Chiappori 1998). 
Because IV estimates in this paper are based on exogenous variation in benefits, they are 
informative of the likely effect of policies that redistribute cash to rural families with children in 
Brazil. While it is up for debate whether the estimated impact of cash benefits suggest they 
would be a cost-effective instrument to increase school enrollment or reduce child labor for girls 
(monthly benefits of R$100 boosted girls’ enrollment rates by almost 10 percentage points), it is 
remarkable that no effect was found for boys’ outcomes. Given the relatively large magnitude of 
the benefits, the absence of a reduction in boys’ child labor related to this social security reform 
challenges the validity of the “luxury axiom” for understanding child labor in rural Brazil. Given 
the limited or no impact on boys’ outcomes, policymakers interested in boosting enrollment rates 
or reducing child work would be advised to adopt measures that change the relative payoffs and 
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costs of those activities (such as conditioning cash benefits to school attendance) as complements 
to cash transfer programs.16 
Last but not the least, one additional remark about the interpretation of these estimates: the 
variation in income used in this paper is not correlated with economy-wide income variation. 
Therefore, the effects of income we estimate do not take into account any change in attitudes or 
social norms towards schooling and child labor due to rising income levels across the board. As a 
consequence, the effects we find are likely to be underestimates of the changes in child labor and 
school enrollment that occur as the overall incomes of household in LDCs rise. 
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Table 1 
THE WORK – SCHOOL ENROLLMENT STATISTICS OF CHILDREN 10-14  
 Year        
 1989 1990 1993 1995 CHANGE 95-89 
          
All children 10-14           
Not Working, Not in school 12.4 12.1 9.4 8.4 -4.0 
Only Working 4.9 4.2 2.4 1.9 -3.0 
Working and Going to School 5.1 4.8 4.4 4.2 -0.9 
Only School 77.6 78.9 83.8 85.4 7.8 
Boys 10-14      
Not Working, Not in school 12.4 11.8 9.8 8.8 -3.6 
Only Working 6.0 5.6 2.9 2.5 -3.5 
Working and Going to School 6.5 6.1 5.6 5.3 -1.2 
Only School 75.1 76.6 81.7 83.4 8.3 
Girls 10-14      
Not Working, Not in school 12.4 12.5 8.9 8.0 -4.4 
Only Working 3.9 2.8 2.0 1.4 -2.5 
Working and Going to School 3.7 3.5 3.2 3.1 -0.6 
Only School 80.1 81.2 85.9 87.5 7.4 
 
Notes: Source of data is the PNAD household survey (except the Northern region). Working is 
based on the variable work for pay.  
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Table 2. Means and Standard Deviations, PNAD Sub-Sample of Households With Children 10 
to 14 Years Old 
 
Notes: AFTER stands for observations for 1993 and 1995. BEFORE stands for 1989 and 1990. MATURE stands for households 
with at least one person older than 50. RURAL stands for rural location. Monetary values are measured in Reais of January 2002 
using the deflator introduced by Corseuil and Foguel (2002). 
  
ALL MATURE RURAL BEFORE AFTER
Total  benefi ts  in household (In R$ of Jan. 2002) 0.422 [2.0964] 1.114 [3.0929] 0.248 [0.896] 0.39 [2.2589] 0.453 [1.9281]
Female benefi ts  in household 0.113 [0.8881] 0.292 [1.0688] 0.097 [0.5253] 0.091 [0.8545] 0.134 [0.9186]
Male benefi ts  in household 0.309 [1.8725] 0.822 [2.9009] 0.15 [0.676] 0.3 [2.0834] 0.319 [1.6461]
Total  benefi ts  (topcoded at 99 pcti le) 0.37 [1.3683] 0.999 [2.0418] 0.243 [0.8029] 0.328 [1.3179] 0.41 [1.4136]
Ratio of tota l  benefi ts  to tota l  income 0.059 [0.1845] 0.163 [0.2788] 0.063 [0.1915] 0.052 [0.1694] 0.065 [0.1978]
Total  household income 10.481 [19.2894] 9.445 [20.6688] 5.433 [8.6672] 11.009 [18.3521] 9.978 [20.131]
# Benefi t receivers  in household 0.151 [0.4048] 0.433 [0.6021] 0.157 [0.4213] 0.151 [0.3976] 0.152 [0.4116]
# Female beneficiaries  in household 0.058 [0.2406] 0.171 [0.391] 0.065 [0.2525] 0.057 [0.2394] 0.059 [0.2418]
# Male beneficiaries  in household 0.093 [0.2951] 0.262 [0.4491] 0.092 [0.2928] 0.094 [0.2952] 0.093 [0.2951]
Enrol led in school 0.85 [0.3573] 0.809 [0.3934] 0.736 [0.441] 0.82 [0.384] 0.878 [0.3272]
Worked in reference week for pay 0.102 [0.3023] 0.112 [0.3158] 0.106 [0.3084] 0.122 [0.3271] 0.083 [0.2753]
Total  hours  per week 7.639 [15.1483] 8.871 [16.037] 15.083 [18.1994] 8.516 [16.2375] 6.801 [13.9789]
Skin color: black 0.051 [0.2198] 0.06 [0.2369] 0.047 [0.2113] 0.052 [0.2224] 0.05 [0.2173]
Skin color: brown 0.446 [0.4971] 0.495 [0.5] 0.548 [0.4977] 0.443 [0.4967] 0.448 [0.4973]
Number of adul ts  in household 2.33 [0.9448] 2.935 [1.2396] 2.356 [0.8841] 2.36 [0.9597] 2.302 [0.9294]
Female-headed household 0.145 [0.3522] 0.171 [0.3769] 0.082 [0.2745] 0.136 [0.3431] 0.154 [0.3605]
Two parents  present 0.839 [0.3678] 0.797 [0.4023] 0.897 [0.3039] 0.847 [0.3598] 0.831 [0.3751]
# Chi ldren in fami ly 3.621 [2.0336] 3.496 [2.2981] 4.422 [2.3567] 3.864 [2.1373] 3.39 [1.9007]
Number of observations 66,177 19,428 17,297 31,461 34,716
.
ALL MATURE RURAL BEFORE AFTER
Total  benefi ts  in household (In R$ of Jan. 2002) 0.419 [2.0706] 1.127 [3.0184] 0.259 [1.1519] 0.395 [2.2841] 0.441 [1.8385]
Female benefi ts  in household 0.11 [0.7819] 0.287 [1.0196] 0.102 [0.5155] 0.09 [0.758] 0.129 [0.8041]
Male benefi ts  in household 0.309 [1.8825] 0.84 [2.8163] 0.157 [0.9986] 0.305 [2.1254] 0.312 [1.6108]
Total  benefi ts  (topcoded at 99 pcti le) 0.37 [1.3752] 1.012 [2.0826] 0.247 [0.8302] 0.332 [1.3365] 0.406 [1.4109]
Ratio of tota l  benefi ts  to tota l  income 0.057 [0.1811] 0.16 [0.2739] 0.063 [0.1895] 0.051 [0.1682] 0.063 [0.1928]
Total  household income 10.629 [19.476] 9.545 [17.0018] 5.371 [7.0648] 11.17 [22.028] 10.103 [16.5984]
# Benefi t receivers  in household 0.15 [0.4059] 0.433 [0.6065] 0.158 [0.4196] 0.152 [0.4022] 0.149 [0.4095]
# Female beneficiaries  in household 0.058 [0.2412] 0.172 [0.3924] 0.068 [0.258] 0.058 [0.2395] 0.058 [0.243]
# Male beneficiaries  in household 0.092 [0.2952] 0.261 [0.4523] 0.09 [0.2893] 0.094 [0.2973] 0.09 [0.2931]
Enrol led in school 0.874 [0.3315] 0.845 [0.3621] 0.766 [0.4231] 0.847 [0.36] 0.901 [0.2987]
Worked in reference week for pay 0.054 [0.2263] 0.063 [0.2422] 0.057 [0.2319] 0.063 [0.2436] 0.045 [0.2077]
Total  hours  per week 3.482 [11.1544] 4.074 [12] 6.305 [13.7248] 3.726 [11.8349] 3.244 [10.4431]
Skin color: black 0.049 [0.2167] 0.058 [0.2341] 0.045 [0.2079] 0.051 [0.2203] 0.048 [0.213]
Skin color: brown 0.437 [0.496] 0.481 [0.4996] 0.535 [0.4988] 0.432 [0.4954] 0.441 [0.4965]
Number of adul ts  in household 2.339 [0.9563] 2.961 [1.2503] 2.355 [0.887] 2.376 [0.9774] 2.303 [0.9339]
Female-headed household 0.149 [0.3558] 0.176 [0.3811] 0.09 [0.2868] 0.139 [0.3464] 0.158 [0.3645]
Two parents  present 0.838 [0.368] 0.796 [0.4031] 0.892 [0.3099] 0.846 [0.3608] 0.831 [0.3747]
# Chi ldren in fami ly 3.611 [2.0325] 3.487 [2.2905] 4.452 [2.3612] 3.852 [2.143] 3.377 [1.8894]
Number of observations 65,059 19,013 16,072 31,376 33,683
TABLE OF MEANS: BOYS  
GIRLS
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Table 3. Triple Differences on Benefit Levels and Benefit Receivers 
   
Total male benefits
Before:          
1989-90
After:            
1993-95
Time diff. Before:          
1989-90
After:            
1993-95
Time diff. 
0.246 0.991 0.745 0.152 0.494 0.341
[0.041] [0.06] [0.073] [0.016] [0.023] [0.028]
0.174 0.246 0.073 0.106 0.097 -0.009
[0.024] [0.037] [0.044] [0.011] [0.011] [0.016]
0.072 0.744 0.047 0.397
[0.048] [0.071] [0.02] [0.026]
1.472 1.724 0.252 0.409 0.513 0.103
[0.086] [0.082] [0.119] [0.016] [0.016] [0.023]
1.192 1.152 -0.04 0.318 0.276 -0.042
[0.064] [0.062] [0.089] [0.012] [0.011] [0.017]
0.281 0.572 0.092 0.237
[0.107] [0.103] [0.02] [0.02]
Total female benefits
0.114 0.521 0.408 0.114 0.313 0.199
[0.016] [0.035] [0.038] [0.015] [0.021] [0.025]
0.06 0.082 0.022 0.058 0.045 -0.012
[0.008] [0.013] [0.015] [0.008] [0.007] [0.01]
0.054 0.44 0.056 0.267
[0.018] [0.037] [0.016] [0.022]
0.182 0.274 0.092 0.137 0.163 0.026
[0.015] [0.018] [0.023] [0.01] [0.01] [0.015]
0.125 0.092 -0.033 0.089 0.052 -0.037
[0.01] [0.009] [0.013] [0.007] [0.005] [0.008]
0.056 0.182 0.047 0.11
[0.018] [0.02] [0.012] [0.011]
[0.172]
 Oldest male is 60-64 y.o.
 Oldest male is 60-64 y.o.
 Oldest male is 55-59 y.o.
Age diff. at a point in time:
Difference-in-difference: 0.672
[0.086]
 Oldest female is 55-59 y.o.
 Oldest female is 55-59 y.o.
 Oldest female is 50-54 y.o.
Age diff. at a point in time:
Difference-in-difference: 0.386
[0.041]
Difference-in-difference: 0.126
[0.026]
DDD 0.26
[0.049]
 Oldest female is 50-54 y.o.
Age diff. at a point in time:
 Oldest male is 55-59 y.o.
Age diff. at a point in time:
Difference-in-difference: 0.292
[0.149]
DDD 0.381
0.351
[0.032]
0.145
[0.028]
0.205
[0.043]
Notes: Average  male and female benefits are expressed as multiples of R$100 of 2002. Standard errors are given in square brackets. Difference-in-
difference-in-difference (DDD) is the difference-in-difference from the upper panel minus that in the lower panel. 
Panel 1. Male Benefits
Panel 2. Female Benefits
0.063
[0.017]
0.148
[0.032]
Number of males receiving aposentadoria
Number of females receiving aposentadoria
A. Treatment Households: Rural households
A. Treatment Households: Rural households
B: Control Households: Urban households
B: Control Households: Urban households
0.211
[0.027]
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Table 4. Triple Differences on School Enrollment and Market Work 
 
School enrollment
Before:          
1989-90
After:            
1993-95
Time diff. Before:          
1989-90
After:            
1993-95
Time diff. 
0.668 0.749 0.08 0.089 0.065 -0.025
[0.018] [0.017] [0.025] [0.011] [0.009] [0.014]
0.666 0.757 0.091 0.083 0.072 -0.011
[0.013] [0.014] [0.019] [0.008] [0.008] [0.011]
0.003 -0.008 0.006 -0.008
[0.022] [0.021] [0.013] [0.013]
0.865 0.882 0.017 0.119 0.075 -0.044
[0.009] [0.009] [0.013] [0.009] [0.007] [0.011]
0.864 0.904 0.04 0.095 0.071 -0.024
[0.007] [0.006] [0.01] [0.006] [0.006] [0.009]
0.001 -0.022 0.024 0.004
[0.012] [0.011] [0.011] [0.009]
School enrollment
0.673 0.752 0.078 0.111 0.081 -0.03
[0.019] [0.017] [0.025] [0.013] [0.011] [0.017]
0.686 0.762 0.075 0.086 0.069 -0.017
[0.012] [0.012] [0.017] [0.007] [0.007] [0.01]
-0.013 -0.01 0.025 0.012
[0.022] [0.021] [0.015] [0.013]
0.854 0.866 0.012 0.102 0.082 -0.02
[0.009] [0.008] [0.012] [0.008] [0.007] [0.01]
0.844 0.89 0.047 0.112 0.085 -0.027
[0.007] [0.006] [0.009] [0.006] [0.005] [0.008]
0.01 -0.024 -0.01 -0.003
[0.012] [0.01] [0.01] [0.009]
 Oldest male is 60-64 y.o.
Panel 1. Male Benefits
Market work
A. Treatment Households: Rural households
[0.031] [0.018]
 Oldest male is 55-59 y.o.
Age diff. at a point in time:
Difference-in-difference: -0.011 -0.014
[0.016] [0.014]
B: Control Households: Urban households
 Oldest male is 60-64 y.o.
 Oldest male is 55-59 y.o.
Age diff. at a point in time:
Difference-in-difference: -0.023 -0.02
Market work
DDD 0.012 0.006
[0.035] [0.023]
Panel 2. Female Benefits
[0.031] [0.019]
A. Treatment Households: Rural households
 Oldest female is 55-59 y.o.
 Oldest female is 50-54 y.o.
Age diff. at a point in time:
Difference-in-difference: 0.003 -0.013
[0.015] [0.013]
B: Control Households: Urban households
 Oldest female is 55-59 y.o.
 Oldest female is 50-54 y.o.
Age diff. at a point in time:
Difference-in-difference: -0.034 0.007
Notes: Standard errors are given in square brackets. Difference-in-difference-in-difference (DDD) is the difference-in-difference from the upper panel 
minus that in the lower panel. 
DDD 0.037 -0.02
[0.034] [0.023]
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Table 5. Effect of the reform on benefit take-up and levels 
 
 
 
Notes: The PNAD data sets for 1989, 1990, 1992 and 1995 were used for the regressions above, excluding the observations for the states of the 
Northern region. Each observation represents one household with at least one child of ages 10 to 14, and with no member with 12 years or more of 
education. Robust standard errors are in square brackets. The shaded cells indicate statistical significance at the 5 percent level. 
The specification is the same as equation (1) in the text. This table omits the coefficients on dummies for rural location, after the reform, age of the 
oldest male and female (first-level effects) and interactions between after the reform and rural location; after the reform and ages of the oldest male 
and female; and rural location and ages of the oldest male and female (second-level effects).  
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Number of 
benefit 
receivers
adding fake 
controls
of which:      
Males
of which: 
Females
Total benefits 
(winsorized)
without 
winsorization
adding fake 
controls
of which:      
male benefits
of which: 
female bens.
Oldest Male Age 60-64 X Rural X After 0.296 0.303 0.231 0.0652 0.557 0.54 0.557 0.473 0.0854
[0.045] [0.046] [0.035] [0.025] [0.147] [0.262] [0.149] [0.13] [0.037]
Oldest Male Age 65+ X Rural X After 0.0629 0.0682 0.00818 0.0547 0.467 0.415 0.474 0.446 0.0264
[0.035] [0.035] [0.025] [0.023] [0.12] [0.192] [0.12] [0.106] [0.034]
Oldest Female Age 55-59 X Rural X After 0.199 0.188 0.0502 0.149 0.375 0.427 0.358 0.0518 0.285
[0.039] [0.04] [0.025] [0.029] [0.113] [0.163] [0.116] [0.091] [0.044]
Oldest Female Age 60+ X Rural X After 0.13 0.128 0.00498 0.125 0.601 0.679 0.609 0.103 0.451
[0.033] [0.033] [0.016] [0.028] [0.083] [0.132] [0.083] [0.057] [0.04]
Joint significance of triple interactions
F(4,90802) 26.09 25.87 13.55 18.98 29.11 12.72 29.57 9.89 49.17
F-test joint sign. of instruments (p-value) 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
Oldest Male Age 55-59 X Rural X After 0.0515 0.149
[0.029] [0.117]
Oldest Female Age 50-54 X Rural X After -0.0032 0.0903
[0.024] [0.085]
F-test fake instruments (p-value) 0.1900 0.1935
Number of observations 90802 90802 90802 90802 90802 90802 90802 90802 90802
Number of groups 9512 9512 9512 9512 9512 9512 9512 9512 9512
R-squared 0.82 0.82 0.832 0.715 0.629 0.452 0.629 0.615 0.692
FIRST STAGE REGRESSIONS 
m
new
f
new
m
raise
f
raise
m
fake
f
fake
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Table 6. Children outcomes and benefits eligibility. 
 
Notes: The PNAD data sets for 1989, 1990, 1992 and 1995 were used for the regressions above, excluding the observations for the states of the Northern region 
and the households with at least one member with 12 years or more of education. Standard errors are in square brackets. The shaded cells indicate statistical 
significance at the 5 percent level.  
The specification is the same as equation (1) in the text. This table omits the coefficients on dummies for rural location, after the reform, age of the oldest male and 
female (first-level effects) and interactions between after the reform and rural location; after the reform and ages of the oldest male and female; and rural location and 
ages of the oldest male and female (second-level effects). The regressions are calculated on group means (as suggested by Angrist and Pischke 2008, pp. 313-314), 
where groups are defined by age of the oldest male and female (in 5 year brackets), after and rural location.  
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
Skin color: 
black
Youngest child 
in family
# Children in 
family
# Adults in 
family
Boys Girls Boys Girls Boys Girls All All All All
Oldest Male Age 60-64 X Rural X After -0.0164 0.0187 0.0457 0.0471 3.34 1.57 -0.0027 0.0482 0.2040 -0.0087
[0.048] [0.054] [0.036] [0.025] [1.85] [1.63] [0.02] [0.038] [0.199] [0.11]
Oldest Male Age 65+ X Rural X After 0.00404 0.0605 0.00588 0.00062 -0.36 0.997 0.0147 -0.0380 -0.1890 0.0142
[0.044] [0.034] [0.029] [0.024] [1.65] [1.23] [0.016] [0.03] [0.213] [0.11]
Oldest Female Age 55-59 X Rural X After -0.0104 0.0281 0.00541 -0.0497 -1.95 -0.18 -0.0116 0.0067 0.0544 -0.1170
[0.051] [0.045] [0.028] [0.027] [2.03] [1.66] [0.021] [0.047] [0.223] [0.142]
Oldest Female Age 60+ X Rural X After 0.00754 0.0574 -0.0212 -0.0483 0.0826 -2.28 -0.0196 0.0280 -0.0690 0.0157
[0.037] [0.038] [0.024] [0.023] [1.53] [1.26] [0.015] [0.029] [0.237] [0.092]
F-test joint sign. of instruments (p-value) 0.9933 0.0423 0.6232 0.0296 0.4278 0.3621 0.6771 0.3713 0.6113 0.9406
Oldest Male Age 55-59 X Rural X After -0.0234 0.0339 0.0491 -0.00802 0.811 0.838 -0.0054 -0.0502 0.1160 0.0698
[0.046] [0.046] [0.025] [0.023] [1.79] [1.32] [0.012] [0.036] [0.201] [0.094]
Oldest Female Age 50-54 X Rural X After -0.0636 0.00828 0.0106 0.00564 1.54 0.6 -0.0117 -0.0004 0.2470 -0.0871
[0.04] [0.038] [0.027] [0.022] [1.42] [1.09] [0.013] [0.029] [0.169] [0.082]
F-test fake instruments (p-value) 0.2568 0.749 0.0898 0.9259 0.4641 0.5788 0.4829 0.3092 0.2149 0.5279
Number of observations 66260 65146 66260 65146 66260 65146 131406 131406 131406 131406
Number of groups 399 398 399 398 399 398 797 797 797 797
R-squared 0.823 0.824 0.535 0.364 0.902 0.726 0.27 0.884 0.865 0.953
REDUCED FORM REGRESSIONS 
Enrolled in school Worked for pay Hours of work per week
m
new
f
new
m
raise
f
raise
m
fake
f
fake
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Table 7. OLS Estimates of the Effect of Old-Age Benefits on Children Outcomes 
 
Notes:  The PNAD data sets for 1989, 1990, 1993 and 1995 were used for the regressions above, excluding the 
observations for the states of the Northern region. There are 66,260 observations for the boys and 65,146 for the girls. 
The regressions are calculated on group means (as suggested by Angrist and Pischke (2008), pp. 313-314). Standard 
errors are in square brackets. The shaded cells denote statistical significance at the 5 percent level. This table omits the 
coefficients on dummies for rural location, after the reform, household composition (first-level effects) and interactions 
between after the reform and rural location; after the reform and household composition; and rural location and 
household composition (second-level effects).  
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Total benefits 0.026 0.020 0.042 0.035
[0.012] [0.01] [0.043] [0.037]
Female benefits 0.003 0.049 -0.003 0.025
[0.035] [0.033] [0.057] [0.052]
Male benefits 0.033 0.016 0.089 0.048
[0.015] [0.011] [0.065] [0.052]
F-test: female = male  (P-value) 0.429 0.346 0.279 0.754
Total benefits -0.003 -0.004 0.031 0.007
[0.011] [0.007] [0.029] [0.026]
Female benefits 0.010 -0.009 0.050 0.010
[0.024] [0.023] [0.038] [0.038]
Male benefits -0.005 -0.002 0.011 0.003
[0.014] [0.008] [0.044] [0.036]
F-test: female = male  (P-value) 0.599 0.783 0.509 0.892
Total benefits -0.296 -0.211 0.959 0.895
[0.497] [0.325] [1.61] [1.37]
Female benefits 1.460 -0.878 3.700 0.250
[1.43] [1.23] [2.37] [2.01]
Male benefits -0.647 -0.003 -1.950 1.800
[0.563] [0.378] [2.14] [1.88]
F-test: female = male  (P-value) 0.153 0.500 0.069 0.586
ENROLLED IN SCHOOL
WORKED FOR PAY
TOTAL HOURS PER WEEK, ALL JOBS
OLS ESTIMATES 
Benefit Levels (In R$100 of Jan. 2002) Number of benefit receivers
BOYS GIRLS BOYS GIRLS
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Table 8. IV Estimates of the Effect of Old-Age Benefits on Children Outcomes 
 
Notes:  The PNAD data sets for 1989, 1990, 1993 and 1995 were used for the regressions above, excluding the 
observations for the states of the Northern region. There are 66,260 observations for the boys and 65,146 for the girls. 
The regressions are calculated on group means (as suggested by Angrist and Pischke (2008), pp. 313-314). Standard 
errors are in square brackets. The shaded cells denote statistical significance at the 5 percent level. This table omits the 
coefficients on dummies for rural location, after the reform, household composition (first-level effects) and interactions 
between after the reform and rural location; after the reform and household composition; and rural location and 
household composition (second-level effects). 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Total benefits 0.002 0.097 -0.037 0.236
[0.032] [0.036] [0.094] [0.111]
Female benefits 0.038 0.098 0.049 0.531
[0.086] [0.085] [0.193] [0.283]
Male benefits -0.032 0.101 -0.103 -0.159
[0.08] [0.074] [0.149] [0.344]
F-test: female = male  (P-value) 0.642 0.986 0.589 0.227
Total benefits 0.001 -0.036 0.067 -0.082
[0.02] [0.022] [0.066] [0.068]
Female benefits -0.056 -0.130 -0.054 -0.452
[0.062] [0.055] [0.119] [0.225]
Male benefits 0.054 0.047 0.159 0.412
[0.059] [0.046] [0.117] [0.221]
F-test: female = male  (P-value) 0.327 .0.0459 0.278 0.036
Total benefits 0.174 -0.849 4.300 -0.780
[1.2] [1.25] [3.48] [3.97]
Female benefits -2.750 -5.580 -6.520 -15.100
[3.9] [2.8] [8.46] [10.2]
Male benefits 3.100 3.380 12.500 18.300
[3.36] [2.51] [6.43] [11.1]
F-test: female = male  (P-value) 0.386 .0.0457 0.136 .0.0805
ENROLLED IN SCHOOL
WORKED FOR PAY
TOTAL HOURS PER WEEK, ALL JOBS
STRUCTURAL INSTRUMENTAL VARIABLES ESTIMATES 
Benefit Levels (In R$100 of Jan. 2002) Number of benefit receivers
BOYS GIRLS BOYS GIRLS
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Table 9. Robustness check: Effect of total benefits in household for different samples 
 
 
 
Notes: This table presents estimates of the same equation as in Table 8, but for different samples. Standard errors are in square brackets and they are 
clustered by household composition type  The sample denoted ALL includes all children age 10-14; the MATURE subsample is obtained by dropping all 
households without a resident older than 50 (92181 observations) and whose residents older than 50 have 12 years of schooling or more (2016 observations); 
NE denotes Northeastern region; 13-14 includes only the 13-14 year olds from the ALL sample; HEAD < 4 includes only the households whose head has less 
than 4 years of schooling from the ALL sample.  
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12)
Sample All Mature NE Rural 13-14 Head < 4 yrs All Mature NE Rural 13-14 Head < 4 yrs
ENROLLED IN SCHOOL
0.002 0.055 -0.017 -0.031 0.011 0.005 0.097 0.152 0.135 -0.013 0.169 0.115
[0.032] [0.047] [0.052] [0.059] [0.04] [0.04] [0.036] [0.052] [0.061] [0.037] [0.08] [0.046]
WORKED FOR PAY
0.001 -0.029 -0.018 0.005 -0.014 0.002 -0.036 -0.038 -0.080 0.043 -0.061 -0.054
[0.02] [0.029] [0.036] [0.033] [0.03] [0.027] [0.022] [0.028] [0.037] [0.019] [0.047] [0.031]
TOTAL HOURS PER WEEK, ALL JOBS
0.17 -1.17 0.96 5.50 -0.08 0.13 -0.85 -1.37 -3.81 4.01 -2.04 -1.84
[1.2] [1.75] [1.94] [2.59] [1.62] [1.54] [1.25] [1.6] [1.84] [1.4] [2.46] [1.55]
Observations 66,260 19,436 25,710 17,342 26,363 45,413 65,146 19,020 25,130 16,112 25,987 44,140
Number of groups 399 299 395 199 396 398 398 298 394 198 395 398
INSTRUMENTAL VARIABLES ESTIMATES OF THE EFFECT OF BENEFIT LEVELS ON CHILDREN OUTCOMES
GIRLSBOYS
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Table 10. Has the reform changed the number of children living with each elderly? 
 
Notes: The PNAD data sets for 1989, 1990, 1993 and 1995 were used for the regressions above. After denotes the 
years after the reform. The sample consists of all people 50 or older, living in regions other than the Northern 
states, where rural households were not surveyed. The F-stat tests the null that the coefficients on the triple 
interactions are equal to zero. Shaded cells denote statistical significance at the 5 percent level.  
Panel I: Men over 50
Dependent variable # BOYS # GIRLS # BOYS # GIRLS # BOYS # GIRLS
Oldest Male Age 60-64 X Rural X After 0.0148 0.00709 0.0237 0.0387 -0.0144 0.018
[0.023] [0.02] [0.02] [0.027] [0.025] [0.025]
Oldest Male Age 65+ X Rural X After 0.00568 -0.00414 0.0112 0.0136 0.00891 0.00745
[0.017] [0.015] [0.015] [0.02] [0.019] [0.019]
F-Stat (p-value): 0.8159 0.828 0.5019 0.3792 0.6078 0.7745
R-squared 0.877 0.897 0.963 0.921 0.964 0.939
Groups 124 124 124 124 124 124
Observations 77,525 77,525 77,525 77,525 77,525 77,525
Panel II: Women over 50
# BOYS # GIRLS # BOYS # GIRLS # BOYS # GIRLS
Oldest Female Age 55-59 X Rural X After 0.0271 -0.00603 0.00532 0.00127 -0.0129 -0.0367
[0.028] [0.024] [0.027] [0.027] [0.03] [0.026]
Oldest Female Age 60+ X Rural X After 0.00388 0.00881 -0.0203 -0.00179 -0.00428 -0.0503
[0.022] [0.019] [0.021] [0.021] [0.024] [0.02]
F-Stat (p-value): 0.5438 0.7046 0.3872 0.9876 0.9072 0.062
R-squared 0.1346 0.1265 0.1359 0.1392 0.1418 0.1387
Groups 124 124 124 124 124 124
Observations 90,145 90,145 90,145 90,145 90,145 90,145
15-195-9 10-14
5-9 10-14 15-19
m
new
f
new
m
raise
f
raise
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Figure 1 
 
 
The figures above show the time series behavior of the proportion of boys and girls who 
“worked for pay”. The vertical line on 91 divides the period in before and after the reform. Source: 
PNAD. 
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Figure 2 
 
The figures above show the time series behavior of the proportion of boys and girls who are “enrolled in 
school”. The vertical line on 91 divides the period in before and after the reform. Source: PNAD.
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Figure 3 
 
  
 
The figure above presents the flow of rural pensions granted for each year between 1980 and 
1996. Notice that the spike starts in 1992 and lasts until 1994. Source: Anuário Estatístico da 
Previdência (1997), in de Carvalho Filho (2008). 
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Appendix. Construction of Children’s Outcomes Variables 
 
Work for pay. 
The variable work for pay is equal to one if the child recorded a positive income from work; 0 
otherwise. The primary variable that we used were the variables “Renda mensal todos 
trabalhos” (V601 for PNAD 1989 and 1990) and “Valor renda mensal todos trabalhos” (V4719 
for PNAD 1993 and 1995) 
 
Enrolled in school. 
The variable enrolled in school is equal to 1 if the survey response to the question “Frequenta 
escola?” is not equal to 0 which is the code for “não frequenta” (V312 for PNAD 1989 and 
1990); or it is equal to 2 which is the code for “sim” (V0602 for PNAD 1993 and 1995). Notice 
that this variable could as well be translated as “attended school”. The question asks if the child 
“frequenta escola” without referring to a specific time frame (as the questions on work are 
phrased), so we interpret as referring to whether the child eventually attends school or is 
enrolled at school. 
 
Total hours of work 
For the years 1989 and 1990, we use the variable V5100 (“Horas em todos trabalhos”); for the 
years 1992 and 1993, we sum the variables V9058 (‘Número de horas trabalhadas por semana 
nesse trabalho”), V9105 (“Número de horas trabalhadas por semana nesse(s) outro(s) 
trabalho(s) (excluindo-se o principal e o secundário)”) and V9101 (“Número de horas 
trabalhadas por semana nesse emprego secundário”). We capped total hours at 90 per week. 
We then recode hours to zero if the worker is unpaid and hours are less than 15 per week to 
ensure consistency over time in our hours variable because in the PNADs of 1989 and 1990 
unpaid hours below 15 hours per week were not recorded. 
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1. Financial support from CNPq, the National Institute of Aging, the Center for 
Retirement Research at Boston College and the Schultz Fund at MIT is thankfully 
acknowledged. Daron Acemoglu, Josh Angrist, Abhijit Banerjee, Marcos Chamon, 
Rachel Connelly, Dora Costa, Esther Duflo, Simon Johnson, Leonardo Monasterio, 
Sendhil Mullainathan, Peter Orazem, Steve Pischke, Vladimir Ponczek brought helpful 
comments, encouragement and suggestions at different stages of this project. The 
associated editor and two anonymous referees for this journal offered me constructive 
criticism that much improved the final version of this paper. I am also grateful to 
participants at the MIT Development Economics lunch and seminars at Boston 
University, Bowdoin College and the 2001 NEUDC meeting for their valuable 
comments. Errors are mine. 
2. Emerson and Souza (2007) find that adult earnings for the cohorts born in 1933 to 
1971 in Brazil are maximized at entry age into the labor market between 12 and 14 years 
old.  
3. Edmonds (2007, 2009) provide useful reviews of the most recent work on child labor. 
4. But Kruger (2007) finds that positive shocks to coffee production increase child labor 
in Brazilian coffee producing counties 
5. Before the reform, old-age benefits for rural workers were flat and equal to 50 percent 
of the minimum wage. After the reform, rural workers could choose between a minimum 
benefit equal to one minimum wage or calculated benefits based on their past earnings 
history, but the near totality of rural workers did not have past documented earnings high 
enough to justify a calculated benefit higher than one minimum wage, so for all practical 
purposes, the reform increased benefits to one minimum wage. For a more detailed 
account of the reform, see de Carvalho Filho (2008). 
6. It is worth mentioning now that if families can borrow against future anticipated 
income (permanent income), schooling and child labor decisions would not depend on 
the timing of pension receipts (Edmonds 2006).  
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7. Source: ILO (1996), based on statistics organized by Ashagrie (1993), as quoted in 
Basu (1999). 
8. Krueger (1996) argues that compulsory schooling laws are usually not enforced in 
developing countries. 
9. For an evaluation of the PETI program, see World Bank (2001). 
10. Some respondents may misclassify their aposentadoria and pensão benefits. The 
results are robust to aggregating those two classes of income. 
11. In a previous version of this paper we included the variable “Worked in reference 
week?” which included work without pay in a family farm or small business, as well as 
some forms of household work. However, there were changes in the survey instrument 
questions regarding unpaid work after 1990. The changes in the survey instrument might 
be immaterial for our estimates if captured by the year fixed effects, but if they affect 
observed responses in a manner that is correlated with the presence of rural workers 
affected by the reform, our estimates would be biased. Thus we decided to exclude that 
variable from this version of the paper. 
12. The estimates in this paper are not significantly affected by this change. 
13. de Carvalho Filho (2008) discusses the impact of the reform on benefit take-up rates 
among males.  
14. It is crucial that there be no changes in living arrangements for this empirical strategy 
to provide consistent estimates. In Section VI I argue that neither endogeneity of living 
arrangements nor selection problems seem to be major problems. 
15. de Carvalho Filho (2000b) finds that elderly unmarried, divorced or widowed women 
are more likely to live alone in response to a social security reform that increased their 
benefits. Ardington, Case and Hosegood (2007) find in a panel data set that old-age 
pensions increase the labor supply of prime age male family members, in contrast to the 
results by Bertrand, Miller and Mullainathan (1999) in a single cross-section, and 
attribute it to benefits helping finance the migration of prime-aged males in search for 
employment. 
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16. Glewwe and Kassouf (2008) found that the Bolsa Escola program – the Brazilian 
cash transfer program conditional on school enrollment later to be rebranded as Bolsa 
Família – increased school enrollment for children in grades 1 through 4. Another 
example of a program that conditioned the receipt of cash benefits to school attendance is 
the Progresa program in Mexico (Gomez de Léon, Parker and Hernandez 1999; Schulz 
2004). Margo and Finegan (1996) presents evidence that compulsory schooling laws 
were effective in increasing school attendance in the United States in the beginning of the 
twentieth century when combined with child labor restrictions. 
